By: Tom Kohl

Tom Kohl is a US Army veteran (1988-92), who was in combat in Desert Shield/Storm in Iraq, and who served in the US Army Reserves (1992-95).

Tom worked "on the street" as a police officer for the Dallas Police Department and the Dallas County Police Department from 1995 to 2002. He now is a Special Agent with a Federal Agency.

Tom's father was a Federal Agent.

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I-N-D-E-X

Chapter 1: COMPLACENCY CAN KILL YOU

Chapter 2: TEN DEADLY "ON THE JOB" ERRORS

Chapter 3: THE CALIFORNIA NEWHALL INCIDENT

Chapter 4: WHAT TO CARRY ON AND OFF THE JOB

Chapter 5: COLOR CODING YOUR SURROUNDINGS MAY SAVE YOUR LIFE

Chapter 6: SCHIOPATHIC AND PSYCHOPATHIC BEHAVIORS AND YOUR SURVIVAL

Chapter 7: A DALLAS POLICE STUDY ON WHERE CROOKS GET GUNS

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Chapter 1: COMPLACENCY CAN KILL YOU

The average police officer may work his entire career without having to discharge his weapon in the line of duty. This leads the officers into a sense of self- confidence and security, which can evaporate quickly when a suspect turns violent.

Police officers perform essentially the same functions day after day and often become complacent. An officer may think that since nothing happened yesterday and that he/she has answered the same alarm call at the same time and place 99 times before that number 100 will be no different. These are the thoughts that get police officers killed because each call, no matter how similar in nature to the last, presents its own unique set of circumstances requiring a police officer to be alert and careful.

People who attack police officers look at the uniform and forget the human being that is wearing it because the uniform is a symbol of the government, which they may believe is responsible for their troubles and interference with their lives. When they attack a police officer, it was not because of who he is as a person but what he represents to them.

Psychologists and psychiatrists use the term “negative institutional transference” to describe what happens when a person inappropriately vents his/her hostile feelings toward an institution like the government or a government official like a police officer.

Another reason criminals use violence against police officers is to escape capture or suppress evidence. The latest trend involves gang members assaulting police officers in order to gain status among peers. By assaulting a police officer, the gang member establishes a reputation for willingness to use violence and this instills fear in other gang members.

Each of these reasons explains the motives for violence against police officers to some degree. However, there are three other important reasons why people attack law enforcement officers.

The first reason is that the officer represents some kind of threat to the offender, such as the threat of punishment or interference in a criminal act.

The second reason an offender may attack is that he believes that the officer is vulnerable to assault.

Third, the offender possesses the means to do harm.

The first thing to realize about interacting with suspects and offenders is that they always present a potential for being dangerous.

The second is that there are no techniques for dealing with them that work all the time. There will be times, despite the best effort of the officer, that they will resort to violence.

However, there are numerous options for an officer to reduce the potential for violence when encountering a dangerous person. These options include: (1) keeping out of the triangle of violence; (2) developing a sense of awareness; (3) applying color codes when you are in public places (see page 28); (4) following established procedures when confronting or interviewing suspects; (5) never giving the tactical advantage; and (6) never giving up the will to survive when attacked.

To stay out of the triangle of violence it is important to prevent at least one of the sides of the triangle from being formed.

The first side of the triangle is motive. The criminal is threatened by the officer’s ability to capture and punish him and his motive is to avoid capture. The law enforcement officer is someone that keeps the criminal from getting what they want, so if the officer appears weak and vulnerable, the criminal is likely to believe that he can get away with harming the officer; therefore the officer’s chances of getting attacked increase.

A police officer can protect him/herself by presenting an image of competence and authority by standing straight and speaking in a clear and firm manner. Officers should speak in an assertive manner, but not in an aggressive manner because the officer’s aggressive speech may stimulate the suspect to become violent.

Projecting an image of authority, assertiveness, civility and competence may not be enough to reduce a suspect’s motive to commit violence.

The recent traffic stop killing of a police officer in Cortez, Colorado, and the similar killing of an officer in Winslow, Arizona, both indicate that the suspect may have a powerful motive for violence of which an officer may not be aware. In both cases, the officers stopped a vehicle and were unaware of the full extent of the criminal activities of the occupants. Both officers were killed as they approached the suspect’s vehicle.

Eighty percent of the officers’ deaths in Killed In the Line of Duty took place when the officer initially approached the suspect.

Therefore, a second way of handling the motive side of the triangle is to get as much information as possible before approaching the suspect. Use the radio to call for backup and run a license plate check to see if the vehicle is stolen or wanted before approaching the vehicle.

In short, an officer needs to get all the information he/she can before acting. Sometimes, an officer makes the mistake of assuming that he/she is sufficiently street wise to size up a suspect quickly and approach him without a plan.

It is important to note that one of the characteristics of the officer-victims studied by the FBI was the officer mistakenly felt they he/she could “read” the criminal’s intent. This gave the officer a false sense of confidence and allowed him to become the victim.

The second side of the triangle is composed of the suspect having the means to do the officer harm.

The FBI study found that most officer deaths and injuries were caused by handguns. This is to be expected since handguns are easy to conceal and are quick to bring into action.

Moreover, anything, including hands and feet, can become a lethal weapon. One of the biggest mistakes a police officer can make is not watching the suspect’s hands.

Officers should scan the suspect’s clothing for pockets that sag or suspicious bulges.

Above all, officers should watch the suspect’s body language because the suspect’s words and facial expression might protest their innocence.

Another dangerous situation is where the suspect will not show the officer his hands and the suspect’s body language is conveying danger signs. A police officer must break himself/herself of society’s rule of looking one in the eyes while speaking.

In police work an officer must approach the suspect with a plan of action and be observant of the surroundings and the suspect’s clothes, actions, body language and most importantly his hands. There is an old saying in the law enforcement community that rookies are told, “It is the suspect’s hands that are going to kill you not his eyes; control his means of hurting you and you have won half the battle”.

The third side of the triangle is opportunity.

Limiting the suspect’s opportunity comes from accepted law enforcement techniques taught in the police academies such as the proper way to conduct felony traffic stops, approaching suspects, conducting interviews and searches and making arrests where the police officer has the maximum control over the situation.

It is important to realize that a common characteristic of officer-victims studied in Killed in the Line of duty was they did not follow these accepted procedures, especially with respect to arrest, confrontations with prisoners, traffic stops, and waiting for backup.

These officers died because they did not follow departmental regulations and training doctrines and put themselves in imminent jeopardy when they gave the suspect the means, motive and opportunity to either injure or kill the officer.

Chapter 2: TEN DEADLY "ON THE JOB" ERRORS

There is little truly new on the subject of officer survival tactics. It is the simple, unglamorous basics that will keep an officer alive.

Sadly, the same mistakes that have occurred for over a century continue to get officers killed. The following are ten common errors that can be recognized, anticipated, and avoided.

ONE

The most common error is failure to maintain proficiency of the weapon, vehicle or equipment. The stories of the empty gun, the sidearm so neglected it failed to fire, or the ammo green with verdigris happen entirely too often. Routine scheduled fire practice with others on the same shift will help avoid the problems outlined above and encourage team building.

For most officers the routine traffic stop is an ever-present threat. Each situation is different, the weather and visibility conditions, the topography of the roadway, the volume and speed of traffic, the number of suspects in the vehicle, the situation that leads up to the stop. The officer’s common sense is always his best friend.

Traffic stops can turn fatal at any time. It is possible to vary the approach to the suspect’s vehicle in four different ways. Most officers use the direct approach that leads from their car to the suspects. This is not considered safe on busy interstates and some officers are now positioning in front of the driver’s door. This allows the officer a much better reactionary time against oncoming traffic dangers, but does not offer the tactical advantage against the driver.

At night, it has been recommended that the encircling approach be used. The officer circles behind his own vehicle and approaches the suspect’s by the passenger’s side. He stops at the rear window. This enables the officer to keep the driver off guard and looking in the wrong direction when the officer appears unexpectedly on his right. This allows a safe view of the interior of the vehicle, more reaction time, and a better view of the driver’s right hand. It also puts the driver off balance by forcing him to turn in his seat and reach over the seat toward the rear passenger’s seat.

Of course, there is the option of staying in the vehicle and over the public address system ordering the driver to step out of the car with his hands in plain sight and come toward police car. This is especially useful if there is more than one person in the suspect’s vehicle.

According to Neal Fortin in his article entitled, Ten Common Errors Leading to Officer Deaths “When you’re first on the scene, distance buys time, and time buys survival.”

Unfortunately, this is only a small part of a much larger, less blatant problem. FBI statistical summaries reveal that of victim officers who managed to shoot back, only 15 percent managed to kill or even hit their assailants. Continual firing practice is essential to allow familiarity in the event of an actual shootout. No assignment can be considered safe.

TWO

The second common error is improper search and use of handcuffs. A combative individual must be subdued, handcuffed, searched, and then transported. If that order were followed consistently there would be fewer deaths. It is important to maintain a position of advantage.

On approach, they officer should keep his gun side away from the suspect. The officer should search the likely areas first (the waistband is the most common locations of weapons for males), but establish a pattern.

A methodical search routine, ingrained as habit, helps prevent missing anything. It’s also necessary to check unusual locations, under hats, inside boots and underwear.

Talk or intimidation may be used to throw off an officer. For example, to prevent a search of the crotch a suspect may shout, “What are you, queer?” Or they may try to lure the officer into a false sense of security by acting submissively. In the event that one weapon is found, keep searching because second weapons are on the increase among criminals, too.

It is extremely important, when a suspect is handed over to another officer, that officer performs a new search because poor searches are the norm.

THREE

The third common error concerns the maintenance necessary for personal health; staying warm, staying dry and staying fed. Excessive workloads, time constraints, off-duty responsibilities and other factors can pressure an officer to ignore how he/she feels and functions. Stopping to take breaks can improve an officer’s productivity and performance.

Being a professional means an officer must know his/her limitations and adjust for them. These are actions of a professional and could very well save an officer’s life.

FOUR

The fourth common error is about missing danger signs. FBI summaries report that of officers slain, almost 60 percent did not even have their guns unholstered.

In even the most common circumstances, an officer must remember to keep his/her senses operating. The officer should notice things out of place, i.e., wearing a coat in hot weather; touching themselves where a gun might be; a shirttail untucked on only one side. Be aware most of all of those who are alert and watching him/her.

There is a need to keep your back to the wall. Look first before entering an area. Take corners wide or use the quick-peek technique. Be alert for hiding places. Beware of distractions. The use of seductively clad females is a common trick.

Trust your senses – including your sixth sense, a gut feeling or the subconscious processing of clues, listen to your inter-self. Be alert. The power of observation is one of the most valuable tools to staying alive.

FIVE

The fifth common error is taking a bad position – the improper use of cover and concealment. Of officers involved in shootings, almost two thirds did not use cover. An officer should think about cover and concealment ahead of time.

He/she should always pay attention to the basics: (1) Don’t bunch up in doorways or hallways; (2) Don’t turn your back on a suspect; (3) Peer to the side, rather than over cover, it offers less exposure; (4) Most people are right handed, so approach suspects from the left; and (5) If they are armed, it will take them longer to target you.

An officer should observe a suspect first, watching for weapons. It is important that an officer plans his/her approach to a suspect and tries to approach from behind. Having to turn, then orientate before targeting, will slow an assailant and give the officer more time to react.

An officer should allow a suspect to first walk past him/her then confront him at his left rear. The officer should confront from a position of cover or have cover nearby it if becomes needed. Care in the approach stage puts the officer in a position of strength, where force is less likely to be needed or used.

SIX

The sixth common error is failure to watch a suspect’s hands. If the officer can’t see the suspect’s hands, it must be assumed that he is armed.

Rather than approach, the officer should get into a position of advantage, ready to respond then order the suspect to keep his hands where they are. The officer has the suspect turn around, facing away from the officer and first place his elbows out, and then slowly expose his hands.

Especially when close, the tendency is strong to look at the suspect’s eyes. There is an old saying that, “The eyes are the windows of the soul,” but an officer must remember that they kill you with their hands.

SEVEN

The seventh common error is relaxing too soon. Officers are often killed approaching downed suspects. The urge to rush up at the earliest moment is strong.

An officer cannot safely assume a suspect is incapacitated just because he is shot, bleeding, and down. An officer should not shoot more than necessary, but should never relax until the danger has ceased.

An officer should never give up cover prematurely. The officer should always approach assuming the suspect is still alive and a lethal threat.

The officer should approach from cover if possible and order the suspect to turn his face away, not allowing him to talk.

A verbal surrender should never be trusted.

Assailants may surrender a weapon in order to surprise an officer with a hidden gun. Unfortunately, multiple guns and hidden back-ups are increasing among criminals. An officer should always suspect and look for other weapons.

EIGHT

The eighth common error deals with the “John Wayne” syndrome. The urge to just rush in is strong. Old, but very good advice is, “Stop, Look and Listen.” Time can be an officer’s ally.

Television and movies teach numerous lies about false bravado – the western Marshall, superman cops, defeating all odds. Actors don’t die.

An officer should wait for back up. When an officer is the first responder, time and distance favor him/her. The further an officer is away from those who would kill him/her, the longer it takes for them to align their weapons and trigger the shots that can kill.

In close, the officer is playing the cop-killer’s game on his own turf.

An officer is trained to fire accurately at 10 yards, 15 yards, 25 or even 50 yards, it’s an officer’s game… so long as they’re smart enough to lengthen the playing field.

The statistics support keeping distance between the officer and the suspect(s). From the NYPD gunfight reports to the FBI’s annual “Officer Killed” summary, the statistics show that officers tend to die in close, not just at 7 yards but at 7 feet, and they tend to neutralize their attackers and survive unscathed as the distances increase.

Distance buys time. Waiting buys time. Time buys survival.

There are few “immutable laws” of police officer survival that go to 100% but this one reaches about 99%. Distance and time will generally favor the police officer that is the first to respond to a life-threatening crisis that involves armed criminals.

NINE

The ninth common error is being preoccupied.

Everyone has bills, and many have spouses and children to worry about. No matter how important those preoccupations are to an officer’s personal life, they are irrelevant during your job as a police officer.

An officer must learn to compartmentalize his/her life, leaving home life at home, work at work, etc.

TEN

The tenth most common error is apathy or complacency. During the last 10 years, more officers were killed on Tuesday than on any other day of the week. More officers have been killed in December (1,275) and January (1,269) than any other months of the year.

Complacency is not stupidity. Complacency sneaks up the smartest of officers. It must be consciously countered.

Most people are surprised to discover that the first year as an officer is not the most dangerous. The training is fresh for the rookie. Everything is still new and is not taken for granted. The rookie’s survival skills and knowledge may be incomplete, but are compensated for by always being on guard.

The fifth year of service is the most deadly. The jobs routine has been repeated often enough that the mind naturally becomes nonchalant. Survival training may be discounted or have become vague. The feeling that one had seen it all would allow one to relax too much. The fifth year represents the greatest risk period for complacency. It also offers the greatest challenge – to continue to use the knowledge an officer gained to stay alert and ready.

Officers let down their guards and fail to use defensive tactics when they should because they don’t want to appear stupid doing those tactics when nothing happens. They also fear embarrassing or inconveniencing innocent civilians if they happen to be wrong.

Most innocent civilians will accept an explanation and an apology. In the event they won’t, the officer’s life is worth more than a civilian’s inconvenience. The officer’s hide, not their pride needs to be protected the most.

Numerous other factors affect officers’ performance. Poor lighting or nighttime conditions can and will claim officers’ lives. Most armed encounters take place at night. Often, they occur in near-total darkness.

The simple fact is that most criminals prefer the cover of darkness to conceal their activities. More officers were killed between 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. than during any other two-hour period over the past decade. At night, there are fewer witnesses.

Officers need to consider poor lighting or nighttime conditions and train to take advantage of it.

Being able to reload and target in low-light conditions is crucial for an officer’s survival. Equipment is another consideration. The proper flashlight and usage is imperative. Tritium-insert night sights are an important aid in low-light shootings. With training, officers can turn the table on criminals by using the element of surprise in low-light situations.

Chapter 3: THE CALIFORNIA NEWHALL INCIDENT

On April 5, 1970, the officer survival movement was born out of one of the darkest days in law enforcement’s history. In less than five minutes, two heavily armed and well-prepared criminals shot and killed four California Highway patrol officers.

These officers were from an agency that was believed to be one of the leaders in police training.

Today the lessons learned from the blood of fellow officers at Newhall are taught in almost every police academy in America.

The incident started as Jack and Pamela Tidwell were driving in rural Newhall, California, and a red Pontiac hardtop swerved across the median into the path of their Volkswagen, cutting them off. The red Pontiac pulled to the roadside and a furious Jack Tidwell, pulled up next to the Pontiac.

Mrs. Tidwell rolled down her window so her husband could give the offending driver a piece of his mind, and he yelled that he had taken the careless driver’s tag number down and was going to report him to the Highway Patrol. Mr. Tidwell then told the driver of the Pontiac that he would like to “kick his ass.”

The lone driver of the Pontiac smiled and called Mr. Tidwell a punk and then raised a .38 snub nose into clear view and pointed it at him. Mr. Tidwell stammered that the Highway Patrol was right behind them.

The driver of the Pontiac looked into his mirror and saw a truck approaching.

Mr. Tidwell put his car into gear and raced away to find a phone to call the police. It took Tidwell fifteen minutes to find a pay phone to call the Highway Patrol.

California Highway Patrol Officers Walter Frago and Roger Gore received the call and set up a stakeout position on the route they anticipated the red Pontiac would take.

At six minutes before midnight, dispatch received a radio message that Officers Frago and Gore had located the red Pontiac, now with two occupants, and were in position behind it.

Officers James Pence, Jr. and George Allen radioed in they were enroute to backup Frago and Gore.

The red Pontiac turned onto Henry Mayo Drive from route 99 and headed for a Standard gas station next to a popular truckstop called Jay’s Restaurant.

Inside the Pontiac was Jack Twining, 35, with a 20-year history of crime including bank robbery, who was on parole at the time for assault on police with deadly weapons, and Bobby Davis, 27, who, with an equally long criminal record, had often boasted that he hated cops and would rather kill one then go to prison again.

Davis and Twining observed the black and white California Highway Patrol car pull in behind them and then begin to follow them. Both criminals knew that their freedom would not survive a car stop because they had been planning to stage a series of bank robberies and had been out target practicing with numerous weapons and also testing new two way radios to see how far they would transmit and receive earlier that afternoon. That was the reason why Twining had not been with Davis during the Tidwell incident.

Davis and Twining, both felons, knew that the arsenal of guns they had with them in their car was enough for the police to send them back to prison for a very long time. Davis and Twining at this point agreed that if they got any chance at all, they would shoot down the officers rather then go back to prison.

The criminals’ arsenal of guns included a Smith and Wesson Model 39 9mm auto, a six inch Colt Python .357magnum, two snub-nosed Colt .38 revolvers, a 1903 Springfield .30/06 bolt action military rifle, a Remington Model 572 .22 pump action rifle, and a Ruger .44 magnum semiauto rifle carbine which was in a jammed condition in the trunk of the Pontiac.

Inside of the car, Davis and Twining had two stolen Colt 1911A1 .45 automatics and a 12 gauge pump sawed-off shotgun in the back seat.

Davis had the Smith and Wesson .38 special snub-nosed revolver with which he had terrorized the Tidwells tucked into his waistband.

Twining had a Smith and Wesson Model 28 .357 magnum in the front seat sitting next to him.

Officers Frago and Gore reported to dispatch that the red Pontiac had pulled into the parking lot of Jay’s Restaurant and had stopped. The red Pontiac stopped approximately 100 feet from the restaurant that had about 30 customers inside.

The lighting was good in the restaurant’s parking lot making it easy for witnesses to see the unfolding events.

Officer Gore pulled the patrol car in behind the red Pontiac in a felony stop position. Both officers got out of the patrol car and Gore drew his .357 magnum service revolver and took up a cover position behind the driver’s door. Frago had a Remington model 870 pump shotgun and moved to cover behind the right fender of the patrol car.

Gore ordered the suspects out of the car three times before finally Davis slowly got out of the driver’s side of the Pontiac.

Gore positioned Davis at the left rear of the Pontiac standing with his feet wide apart and his palms outstretched against the car while Twining was still sitting in the front passenger seat.

Gore began to search Davis while Frago approached the passenger side door where Twining was sitting.

Fargo reached to open the car door, but to do this he had to take the shotgun off of Twining. So Frago raised the barrel up off of Twining, placed the butt of the shotgun on his hip, and attempted to open the car door.

This was the opportunity that the criminals were waiting for and Twining took advantage of it by shooting officer Frago twice in the chest with his .357 magnum, killing him instantly.

Gore, who had reholstered his revolver while searching Davis, drew his service revolver and fired at Twining who returned fire.

Davis took advantage of the fact that Gore was occupied with Twining and drew the .38 special snub-nosed revolver out of his waistband, twice shooting Gore in the right side of his chest, killing him.

As Davis was shooting Gore, Officers Allen and Pence were arriving on the scene.

Davis and Twining were ready for them. Davis and Twining emptied their revolvers at the oncoming police car. Officer Pence was pulling parallel with the rear of Gore and Fargo’s squad car when the criminals’ bullets hit.

Pence barely had enough time to send out a breathless radio message that they were under fire. It was the first notice that dispatch had that something was wrong.

Davis and Twining discarded their empty revolvers and headed toward the Pontiac to retrieve the weapons they had in the backseat. Davis found the sawed-off shotgun and Twining got one of the Colt .45 automatics.

Twining then took a shot at the police cruiser and when his pistol jammed, threw the jammed pistol back into the Pontiac without even trying to clear the jam and grabbed the second Colt .45.

As the squad car came to a halt, Allen jumped out and started to fire at Davis and Twining with his Remington 870 shotgun while maneuvering up to the first patrol car, taking cover behind the open right front door.

Pence took cover behind the driver’s door and fired his service revolver at Davis and Twining.

Allen only managed to hit Twining once in the center of his head with a single stray pellet from his shotgun. Unfortunately, the pellet had lost too much velocity going through the Pontiac’s rear window and didn’t penetrate the skull.

Allen, who had emptied his shotgun, drew his service revolver and moved back to the rear of the first squad car where Pence had taken position. Allen fired four shots and then was hit in the upper chest with buckshot by Davis’s shotgun.

Davis saw that he had hit Allen [with his last shot] , but that the blast had failed to kill him. Allen was struggling to hold himself up in order to get another shot off, [but] as Davis fired again, hitting Allen and critically wounding him.

Pence, on the other hand, had emptied his .357 magnum service revolver and had been hit in the chest and in both legs by rounds fired from Twining’s Colt 45.

Pence was on his knees and attempted to reload his revolver before Twining could kill him.

Just as Pence inserted his sixth round into his revolver Twining shot him in the back of the head, killing him instantly.

Davis and Twining fled the scene in different directions. Davis was caught a few hours later and surrendered while Twining chose to commit suicide instead of surrendering to police.

Numerous lessons were learned because of the Newhall shootout. The first lesson was that not all criminals have cheap guns and don’t know how to shoot.

Davis and Twining had twice the amount of quality firearms as did the responding officers. Both cop killers were practiced shots and were returning from target practice when the shootout occurred.

After the shooting, the California Highway Patrol conducted an internal investigation and found that all four officers in the shootout had less than 2 years of police experience, but were Vietnam veterans. All acted according to their training except they had relinquished their tactical advantage by leaving their positions of cover to arrest Davis and Twining.

The investigation did find that all four officers had not been trained properly. During that time, then Governor Ronald Reagan had expanded the size of the Highway Patrol so fast that there was not a sufficient number of field training officers available to train the incoming recruits.

Furthermore, the investigation found that officers would react to a situation exactly the way they were taught in training.

This occurred with Officer Pence. After Officer Pence had fired his sixth and last round, he tried to perform and reload just the way he was taught at the academy. He dumped the expended rounds from his revolver into his right hand and put the expended rounds in his pants pocket, as he had done on the firing range, then reloaded 6 rounds into his revolver.

This gave Twining enough time to flank Pence and put a bullet in the back of his head.

After the California Highway Patrol learned of this they issued speed loaders to their officers and changed their firearms training program to reflect real life shooting scenarios.

Officers are now taught to reload two rounds into their revolver and reengage the target instead of trying to load six unless from a speed loader.

The California Highway Patrol created an acronym so other officers would remember the lesson from Newhall:

N - Never Approach a danger situation until you’re adequately prepared and supported.

E - Evaluate the Offense and determine if you might just be dealing with something heavier and more dangerous than it looks.

W- Have a plan, Twining and Davis had a plan and they out gunned twice their number of highly trained lawman. The responding CHP officers didn’t…and they died.

A - Always Maintain the Advantage over the opponent. Gore and Frago initially had the tactically dominant position and officer survival experts who interviewed the surviving Bobby Davis believe that he and Twining would have surrendered if the two officers had not abandoned their tactically superior position.

L - Look for the Unusual. The first two officers had reason to believe that the Pontiac contained one or more armed men, yet they ignored the warning and left their cover to approach them.

L - Leave the Scene when in doubt; CHP believes that if Gore and Frago had pulled back out of range when they first perceived reluctance to surrender, they could still have managed to keep a lid on things until backup units responded.

Chapter 4: WHAT TO CARRY ON AND OFF THE JOB

A dilemma for officers is whether to be armed or not off duty.

Statistics on assaults against off-duty officers are given in a publication released yearly by the U.S. Department of Justice in its uniform Crime Reports series.

Based on it, in the ten-year period between 1986 and 1996 one out of every seven officers killed was off duty. The report breaks down the circumstances of the assaults even further. In that same 10-year time period, 88 officers were killed during robberies, a staggering 47 of those officers were off duty at the time.

A police officer is never truly off duty and no matter how he/she is dressed can be recognized because cops walk, talk and act like cops.

It is important that officer formulate survival tactics as more convenience store, fast food business and gas station robberies are being committed during the time when numerous patrons are present.

Before being caught up in an actual robbery – the first rule of gunfighting is to have a gun.

An officer should always formulate a course of action on what to do if, when off duty, he/she comes upon criminal activity. It should be considered in two ways – at a distance and up close – from the parking lot or from inside the store. Time and distance will dictate whether the officer would have the luxury of summoning assistance or need for immediate action. Planning and preparing before the need to act occurs will help an officer avoid becoming next year’s statistic.

It is important to make plans with their spouses, should enforcement action be necessary, so the officer can function without having to worry about the spouse. On numerous occasions preplanning and practice has saved lives.

Criminals are constantly coming up with new and different ways to catch officers off guard. In Houston, Texas, deputy sheriffs have been shot to death in two separate incidents.

The deputies were attempting to make arrests of high-risk suspects by themselves.

With sidearms drawn, the deputies commanded the suspect to back away and put their hands behind their heads. The suspects complied. The suspects continued to cooperate as the deputies approached, holstering their pistols and unsnapping their cuff case.

Both suspects made their move just as the first cuff was snapped on their wrists. With their free hand each retrieved a pistol, one from his waistband and the other from a back pocket, and immediately fired backwards, over their shoulder. Both officers suffered fatal neck wounds.

Since the suspects didn’t actually turn their bodies to face the officers, their movements were not immediately interpreted as threatening. Both fled the scene with a handcuff still on their wrists.

Both suspects were later identified as gang members, and there is speculation that the shooting technique they employed is being taught within the membership of several local gangs.

Another incident involved a drunken man who rode into town on a horse and got upset when his gun was taken away by the female police chief.

The man pulled a second pistol tucked into a pouch strapped to his waist and shot her to death in her office. The shooting took place in front of her niece and nephew, who had come to the station after hearing about the disturbance.

They said he was just sitting in the chair and when she went to answer the phone he jumped up and shot her. He then put the pistol back into the pouch and left the building. He was apprehended later that day.

In Phoenix, Arizona, a striving drug trade and more armed suspects unafraid to use their weapons are contributing to a record number of shootings involving law enforcement officers. Eleven officers have been shot - two of them fatally.

Whether responding to a domestic violence call at a sprawling ranch in the cotton country or serving a warrant, officers are facing more armed encounters with perpetrators who have a total disregard for authority.

Phoenix has been recognized recently as America’s fastest growing metropolis, but it also is gaining unwanted recognition as a hub for the state’s expanding drug trade.

Most of the violence is related to the drug problem. Phoenix has experienced record seizures of narcotics, specifically methamphetamines, a homemade and highly addictive stimulant. The city has the highest number of methamphetamine users and home labs in the country. The city’s police officers bust meth labs on a daily basis and don’t even issue press releases anymore.

In Gwinnet County, Georgia, a law enforcement officer who worked as the courtesy officer at his apartment complex was shot in the neck when he responded to a demented person call. A male subject was shouting and screaming that he was God as he paced back and forth in front of a building. The officer responded and according to witnesses appeared to have calmed the man.

A short time later witnesses heard three gun shots. The officer was shot with his own gun after a short struggle with the suspect. The suspect was taken into custody at the scene.

Case after case reveals that when an officer lets down his guard even for a second, it allows the suspect to turn the tables.

On an average more than 62,000 law enforcement officers are assaulted each year and some 20,000 are injured annually.

While more officers are coming under fire there are positive steps that can be taken. The ten common errors can be studied and used to avoid the known pitfalls. Consistent practicing and role-playing will help keep officers diligent and alert.

Carrying a second weapon is an option. Carrying while off duty is another consideration. The carrying and concealment of a firearm at all times is not an easy task and may seem a burden, so an officer should chose a concealment weapon and holster system as though his life depends upon it – it does.

A police officer’s ability to carry a concealed weapon is a privilege and responsibility not afforded to everyone. Officers should take steps and prepare now to avoid becoming next year’s statistic.

Be aware and go home safe and sound.

Chapter 5: COLOR CODING YOUR SURROUNDINGS MAY SAVE YOUR LIFE

One of the modes used in training, which is helpful, is the use of color codes. The color codes, developed a number of years ago, by Jeff Cooper describe levels of awareness that are combined with the appropriate protective actions a person should take when he or she comes in contact with other people.

The codes primarily relate to public areas, however they can also be relevant to home and building protection. These color codes are similar to military alert levels. There are five color codes that are called “conditions.”

“Condition Yellow” is the level of awareness that most people should adopt when they’re out in public places. When walking down the street, one should keep his head up and use his eyes to “pie” the area, looking at it in slices and changing his depth of focus so he can notice who’s around and what they’re doing. Condition Yellow also involves projecting an image of self-confidence by assuming an upright posture and walking in a relaxed but deliberate manner.

Many people who are on the street go about in Condition White, with their heads down, looking at their feet. These people are easy targets for antisocial individuals.

The next level is “Condition Orange.” A person should be in Condition Orange, when he or she notices something in the environment that doesn’t seem right or when they know they’re about to enter a situation that could be dangerous.

When in Condition Orange, the officer should assess the situation carefully, try to anticipate how violence may occur, and develop a plan for dealing with it if it does.

For example, a person should go to Condition Orange every time he or she approaches an area that has been a frequent location for criminals and their activities. The officer should be aware of the types of violent criminal activity that have occurred there, and take time to notice the places where assailants may hide and begin to develop a plan for responding to the potential for violence.

In addition, every time an officer approaches a suspect, he or she should be in Condition Orange. That means the officer should look around for other suspects and look the suspect over carefully before approaching, paying particular attention to his or her body language and making sure that the suspect’s hands are empty and visible. If the hands aren’t in plain sight, the officer should insist that they become so before approaching.

In addition, the officer should develop a plan for approaching the suspect. The plan should have two parts. The first part should focus on de-escalating the potential for violence, by trying to reduce the suspect’s motive, separating the suspect from the means to do harm, or preventing the suspect from having an opportunity to do harm.

The second part of the plan should focus on responding to violence if it’s not possible to de-escalate. Condition Orange also requires that an officer maintain a self-confident demeanor and not appear vulnerable to assault. The officer should always remember that approaching another human being who is suspected of violating the law is never a routine encounter.

“Condition Red” is the state of readiness an officer should assume whenever he or she observes someone doing something which is illegal, unusual or threatening. Condition Red should also be used whenever the officer suspects that a suspect may employ deadly force.

Being in Condition Red means that an officer has become aware that there is a distinct possibility that the other person may become violent.

There are many Condition Red situations. They range all the way from domestic disputes to traffic stops involving suspected stolen vehicles. The important thing to remember, however, is that the key to handling these situations is having a plan.

“Condition Black” occurs when the suspect acts in a violent manner. At that point, de-escalation is often no longer an option and an officer must implement his or her plan to contain and control the situation.

If an officer doesn’t have a plan when the condition goes to black, he or she will be at a marked disadvantage, especially if the suspect has a plan for dealing with the officer. This last point is very important, because, if the suspect has a plan, the situation can go directly from Condition Yellow or Orange to Condition Black without pausing at any stages in-between.

Chapter 6: SCHIOPATHIC AND PSYCHOPATHIC BEHAVIORS AND YOUR SURVIVAL

Any individual can become violent and the vast majority of society would commit a homicide under the right circumstances. Consequently, it cannot be assumed that the types of offenders discussed [in this paper] HERE are the only ones who may attempt to injure or kill a police officer.

In Killed in the Line of Duty, the FBI studied 93 individuals that attacked and/or killed law enforcement officers and found that the individuals who most frequently committed violent acts against law enforcement officers were males with an average age of about 26.5 years old. They would most likely be unmarried, have a high school degree and be of average height and weight.

Additionally, they would have a previous criminal history and come from an unstable family with some history of alcohol abuse. Moreover, the FBI study also found that a small number of women had attacked and/or killed law enforcement officers.

Therefore, any person with the motive, means and opportunity may assault an officer.

The FBI study found that two types of personality disorders were very common among people who had killed officers. Fifty-six percent had antisocial personalities and twenty-three percent had dependent personalities.

A person who has an antisocial personality knows the rules that govern society, but do not accept the fact that the rules apply to them. The most common types of antisocial personalities involved in officer deaths are sociopaths and psychopaths.

A psychopath has no feelings for the suffering of others and usually only expresses remorse when they think it will convince a policeman, prosecutor, or judge to go easy on them. The sociopath is examined in more depth below because this particular personality disorder presents the greatest danger to officer safety.

The FBI study also found that ninety three percent of the fifty-one killers in the study had been diagnosed with having a personality disorder. Psychiatrists and psychologists who describe individuals that display an ongoing pattern of maladapted social behavior and inappropriate emotional responses use the term “personality disorder”.

The antisocial personality defined as a sociopath, has a history of antisocial acts, beginning in childhood or adolescence and continuing into adulthood. People with this disorder follow their impulses without consideration for others and without experiencing guilt or remorse. They seem to have no conscience and lack many normal emotions. Psychologists believe that sociopaths are the products of parents that have rejected their children. The parents who fail to provide the necessary support and affection do not form the bonds that are necessary for children to learn moral values. The signs of an antisocial personality become apparent before the age of fifteen.

The typical child with an antisocial personality will have serious conduct problems with both the school and legal systems before they turn eighteen. These conduct problems include: truancy; running away; fighting; stealing; destruction of property; cruelty to animals and habitual lying. These conduct problems continue into adulthood and reveal themselves in the following ways: impulsiveness; recklessness; blatant disregard for the truth; excessive irritability and aggression; repeated violations of the law; irresponsible parenting; inability to hold a steady job; failure to honor financial obligations and the incapacity for normal friendships or love.

Individuals with antisocial personalities often seem outgoing, friendly and cooperative when talking to a police officer. The sociopath tries to lull the police officer into a false sense of security while at the same time trying to size up the officer. The sociopath will frequently try to invade the officer’s personal space to see how the officer will react. When questioned by the police officer the sociopath will try to evade questions about themselves and try to control the conversation. Once the sociopath knows what type of person they are dealing with, they try to manipulate their intended victim into giving them what they want or doing something that serves the sociopath’s needs.

When confronted, the sociopathic personality will deny any involvement in illegal activities and often blame others. If this does not work they may rationalize their actions with lies and half-truths and/or their own interpretations of the laws they violated. When the above steps do not accomplish what the sociopath desires and he thinks he can get away with it, he will resort to violence. The most dangerous thing about a sociopath is the suddenness with which he/she employs violence.

The dependant personalities are the complete opposite of antisocial personalities. Dependant people often appear shy and comply willingly with an officer’s directives. The officer must be aware not to develop a false sense of security simply because the person is shy and willingly complies with the officer’s orders. Officers must understand that people with dependant personality disorders may suddenly lash out violently against the officer when faced with the threat of or the actual separation from those on whom they depend.

The characteristic of a dependant person is low self-esteem and their dominant partner becomes their lifeline to the world around them. This is why the dependant person fears both emotional and physical separation from the dominant person. Therefore, any threat toward the dominant partner is perceived by the dependent partner as a life threatening attack on him/her. This phenomenon occurs most often when a police officer tries to arrest a husband for spousal abuse and the wife suddenly attacks the officer.

People with dependent personality are often attached to people with antisocial personalities. These two personalities seem to be a natural match because the antisocial personality is the manipulator and the dependant personality is the willing servant. The dependant person lacks the self-confidence and fears independence while the sociopath thrives on the dependency of the other. The helplessness of the dependant partner provides the rationalization needed to justify the actions by the antisocial partner. For example, when he takes advantage of others he can say he did it to fulfill the dependant’s needs.

While the antisocial personality disorders have contributed significantly to the numbers of officer deaths, other psychiatric disorders have been identified as well. In recent years the number of police officers killed by deinstitutionalized mental patients that refuse to take medication has been on the rise.

In 1998, Michael Lauder, a Yale Law School graduate who suffered from schizophrenia, slashed his fiancée to death with a knife. Jacob Chestnut, who also suffered from schizophrenia, killed two Washington D.C. Capitol police officers.

The total number of individuals with active symptoms of schizophrenia or manic-depressive illness is approximately three and a half million. The National Mental Health Council has estimated that forty percent of them – roughly 1.4 million people - are not receiving any treatment in any given year. It is, therefore, not a question of whether someone will follow Michael Lauder and Jacob Chestnut into the headlines, but when.

Recent studies have shown that about half of those who have schizophrenia or manic-depressive illnesses have markedly impaired insight into their illness. That is, they do not know that they are sick because their brain disease has affected the frontal-lobe circuits that are necessary for complete self-awareness. If they are not sick, they reason, they do not need a cure.

Schizophrenia is a severe disorder with bizarre behavior. When in the acute phase of the disease, its victims are unable to function normally, either at work or in their social lives. Symptoms of schizophrenia generally appear in early adulthood; however, the disorder may begin in middle or late adulthood. A person with schizophrenia will experience delusions that involve irrational beliefs that are held despite overwhelming evidence that these beliefs are wrong. They often believe that extraterrestrial beings or secret agents are plotting against them and are controlling their thoughts and actions. A schizophrenic’s speech is also abnormal. He/she often talks for long periods of time without saying anything of meaning.

Schizophrenia has two phases known as the active and residual phases. During the active phase a schizophrenic’s behavior progressively deteriorates and becomes more and more bizarre. The schizophrenic then enters into the residual stage where the bizarre behaviors lessen but are still present.

Over the last forty years, the use of new medications to treat mental illnesses has improved greatly. Patients with severe illnesses like schizophrenia and manic-depressive disorders have responded well to these new medications and many of them lead quite normal lives. This is one of the main reasons why most of the large mental health institutions have been closed or significantly reduced in size and number. More than ninety percent of state psychiatric hospital beds that existed in 1960 have been eliminated.

However, even with the impressive success rate of the new medications, under the current system of releasing patients without implementing a way to ensure they take their medicine may be the root cause of up to a thousand homicides a year just in the Washington D.C. area.

However, most psychotic individuals, who are merely making threats against others or living on the streets and eating out of garbage cans, are not deemed legally sick enough to qualify for outpatient commitment. The failure of society to take care of the mentally ill is more then just a homeless problem.

At this very moment, on the streets of Dallas, a mentally ill homeless person is being arrested for a crime, such as assault, criminal trespass or sleeping in a public place. This person will be booked into the county jail (Lew Sterrett) and placed into a holding cell with murderers, robbers and any other criminals the police officers in the metroplex have caught that day.

The mentally ill homeless person will be given medicine and will start to conduct himself in a normal manner. If he or she survives their time in jail they will be released and go back on the streets, stop taking their medication, and the pattern of violence will start all over again.

The emerging pattern of violence is clear. It is part of a larger pattern, increasing numbers of severely mentally ill individuals among the homeless population are incarcerated in jails and prisons for offenses committed while psychotic and loitering in parks, public libraries and transportation stations. The pattern is the product of deinstitutionalization gone awry, the discharge of thousands of mentally ill individuals from the nation’s public psychiatric hospitals without ensuring that they get the medication they need to remain well.

In 1988, The Dallas Police Department lost Officer John Chase in a shooting involving a mentally ill person. Officer Chase had stopped a motorist on a traffic violation and was talking to the driver when a mentally ill person approached him and started to argue with him. Officer Chase and the mentally ill man got into a scuffle and he took Officer Chase’s revolver from him and shot him in the face while Officer Chase, on his knees, begged for his life. The mentally ill man was later killed in a shoot out with the police a block from where Officer Chase was murdered.

Violence has become an everyday event in our nation’s news broadcasts and publications. However, most people have had very little personal experience with it. This holds true for most police officers as well.

Chapter 7: A DALLAS POLICE STUDY ON WHERE CROOKS GET GUNS

A year long study was made by the Dallas Police Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in which recovered guns that had been used in crimes, were traced. The study began in October 1997 and continued through September 1998. Some very important facts came to light.

When the locations of recovered guns were sorted by zip code, it became clear that most of the suspects lived inside the City of Dallas.

In other large metropolitan areas there is usually an influx of guns from the outside communities into the central areas, but Dallas was unique because very few guns came from outside the city.

When the numbers of gun recovered were applied to the zip code and paired with police substations, high crime areas were clearly delineated.

With that information, local, state and federal law enforcement efforts could be concentrated where they would be most effective.

Weapons used to commit crimes were also traced to states from coast to coast and border to border. However, the majority came from within the state of Texas - a total of 2,964 guns were purchased in Texas alone. But, no state failed to contribute a gun to crime.